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Comments
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION LOOKS
AT CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PLANS*
A significant aspect of the federal government's program for
controlling "big business" is found in the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission to supervise reorganization plans.
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935' contains the
first and most sweeping grant of this new'power. Section 11 (f) of
that Act provides that, in the reorganization of any corporation
w This comment was prepared at the Harvard Law School in connection
with Mr. E. Merrick Dodd's graduate seminar in Corporation Finance. The
helpful advice of Mr. Dodd is acknowledged and appreciated.
1. 49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 (1938). "The most dynamic legislation
of the New Deal affecting corporations may very well be the Public Utilities
[693]
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subject to its provisions, the approval of the Commission is prerequisite to the submission of any proposed financial plan to the
reorganization court. With the passage of the Chandler Bankruptcy Act 2 in 1938, the influence of the Commission was extended
to the reorganization of other types of corporate enterprises.
Under the latter Act, it is provided that, in all cases involving
indebtedness of more than $3,000,000, proposed plans of reorganization deemed worthy of consideration by the judge must be submitted to the Commission for examination and advisory report.6
In reorganizations involving a smaller amount of debt, the proposed plans may be, but are not required to be, submitted to the
Commission for such reports. 4 The Commission is taking its duties
seriously and has indicated that, in the interest of the public good,
it will carefully scrutinize each plan even though none of the
parties immediately concerned have made any objection to its
terms.5
Holding Company Act of 1935. Quite apart from its program of economic
planning in which the 'death sentence' provisions play so prominent a part,
the Act provides a basis for realigning the legal principles of corporate
practice.... The broad objective of the Act is to protect investors, consumers
and the public in general from certain abusive practices in corporate finance
and management. These practices were regarded as particularly objectionable in the public utility field where corporate structures and securities had
attained a high degree of complexity. The Act proposes to eliminate some
of these practices and modify others by a comprehensive program of simplification which is designed to narrow the gap between ownership and management and affects the securities of the individual company, its corporate
structure, and the set-up of the holding company system to which it belongs."
Meck and Cary, Regulation of Corporate Finance and Management Under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 216,
216-217.
2. 52 Stat. 840, 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. (1938). See Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act (1938)
52 Harv. L. Rev. 1; Miller, Reorganization Plans under Chapter X (1940) 2
LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 481.

3. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by Act of June 22, 1938, c. X, §§
172, 173, 52 Stat. 890, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 572, 573 (1938). The purpose of such opinions is to advise both the court and the security holders as to the merits of the
proposed plans. In the Matter of Detroit International Bridge Co., S.E.C.
Corporate Reorganization Release No. 9, March 24, 1939.
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended by Act of June 22, 1938, c. X, §
172, 52 Stat. 890, 11 U.S.C.A. § 572 (1938).
5. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 27, n. 45, citing National Surety
Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426, 53 S.Ct. 678, 77 L.Ed. 1300 (1932). Compare the
following language "It is the duty of the court to pass upon the feasibility of the plan of reorganization. Although the plan were unopposed, the
court should not approve any feature fundamentally unsound. Especially
when the objectionable feature is a new holding company whose securities
when issued may be sold to the public ..
" In re American Department
Stores Corp., 16 F. Supp. 977, 979 (Del. 1936).
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Our purpose here is to examine the first fourteen reports'
which the Securities and Exchange Commission has handed down,
under the two statutes mentioned, with a view of determining
what criteria the Commission is adopting in passing upon proposed reorganization plans. The fundamental standards are readily
seen. Fairness and feasibility of the plans appear to be required
by both Acts; the basic designs7 of the Holding Company Act provide important factors for consideration where corporations subject to it are concerned; further, it is apparent that-taking a
broad view of its tasks-the Commission is considering all elements which it deems important in the protection of suppliers of
capital from losses due to irresponsibility of management., We
shall endeavor to ascertain how the Commission is interpreting
and applying these standards in specific cases.
FAIRNESS

The Chandler Act specifically provides that reorganization
plans thereunder shall be "fair and equitable"9 and the Commission has ruled that, in examining plans as required by Section
11 (f) of the Holding Company Act, it must give consideration to
the standards supplied by other sections of that Act. 10 Section 11
(e) provides that the plan must be "fair and equitable to the
persons affected by such plan."
In determining "fairness" the Commission has felt that it
must look to the established precedents of the courts (in equity,
under Section 77B of the old Bankruptcy Act and under Chapter
6. As of May 1, 1940, the Commission has handed down six opinions
dealing with reorganization plans of corporations subject to the Holding
Company Act and eight advisory opinions under the Chandler Act. For a
statistical analysis of corporate reorganizations instituted under the Chandler

Act during 1939, see S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 20, Statistical Series Release No. 390, Feb. 29, 1940.

7. See note 1, supra.
8. For a discussion of problems arising from the increasing divergence

of interest between ownership and "management" of modern corporations,
see Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)
passim, especially Book 1, c. VI, and Book II.
9. Chapter X, §§ 174, 221. These sections require that the plans shall not

be approved by the judge unless the plans are "fair, equitable and feasible."
Cf. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 77B(f)(1). Questions of "feasibility" are discussed infra, p. 706 et seq.
10. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 2 and p. 3, n. 6. See also
In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 110 (Holding
Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938). Noted (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 680.
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X of the 1938 Act). The Boyd case", was cited and its "fixed principle" that non-contributing stockholders may not participate in
the new plan at the expense of senior security holders, 12 was
relied upon in the first reorganization plan opinion which the
Commission handed down' 8 and has been consistently followed in
all subsequent opinions. The recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.14 has stated
the comparatively extreme view that the only basis for stockholder participation in the reorganization of an insolvent corporation is a fresh contribution in "money or money's worth." Securities and Exchange Commission opinions rendered since the date
of that decision have cited it 5 as authority for adherence to "strict
11. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S.Ct. 386, 57 L.Ed. 931
(1913), noted in (1913) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 467. Formerly regarded as a "veritable
demon incarnate" by the reorganization bar (see Cravath, The Reorganization of Corporations in Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation (1917) 153, 197) the Boyd doctrine does not appear
to arouse the same hostility today (see Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade in Some Legal Phases of
Corporate Financing, Reorganization and Regulation (1931) 133, 134). The
view that the doctrine is unduly favorable to minorities, giving them opportunities for dilatory tactics, is still, however, a familiar criticism. See Rodgers
and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 571, 588; Swaine, Corporate Reorganization Under the Federal Bankruptcy Power (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 317,
328.
12. "The doctrine of the Boyd case and its successor, the Kansas City
Railway case [K. C. Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445,
46 S.Ct. 549, 70 L.Ed. 1028 (1936)] [is] to the effect that a fair plan must give
adequate recognition to the legal priorities of creditors as against stockholders. This doctrine is frequently amplified so as to require that similar
recognition be given to the legal priorities existing between various classes
of creditors." Dodd, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganizations (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 223, 235. See also
Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 Va. L. Rev. 541, 551.
The S.E.C. has stated the "fairness" issue succinctly, saying "...
we
must determine whether the treatment accorded to the various classes of
creditors and stockholders adequately recognizes their respective rights and
priorities in the light of the assets and earnings available for such purposes."
In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company
Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 19. See also Finletter, Principles of
Bankruptcy Reorganization (1939) c. VI.
13. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104 (Holding
Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938).
14. 307 U.S. 619, 60 S.Ct. 1, 84 L.Ed. 22 (1939), noted in (1940) 53 Harv.
L. Rev. 485. See Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Case and its Implications (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 713. See also Miller, Reorganization Plans
Under Chapter X, supra note 2, at 488-490, The reorganization arose under
Section 77B of the old bankruptcy act. It had been asserted that the rule of
the Boyd case was inapplicable to proceedings under that section. In re Burns
Bros., 14 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); In re Peyton Realty Co., 18 F. Supp.
822 (E.D. Pa. 1936).
15. In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6,' 1940, p. 9; In the Matter of San Fran-
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priority" principles and have specifically rejected plans which
1
were based on the theory of "relative priority," " saying that "the
mere allocation of securities and amounts identical to those of
existing claims gives no assurance of the fairness of any plan;
participation by junior interests must be predicated upon the existence of value in the debtor's properties sufficient to cover senior
18
claims. ' 17 In its most recent opinion, the Commission was met
with the argument that, if the corporation in reorganization were
not actually insolvent, strict legal priorities would not need to be
preserved, and junior security holders who had some remaining
equity could "contract" with creditors for some sacrifices upon
the part of the latter. 9 The Commission disallowed this contenbe followed
tion, determining that the "full priority rule" must
20
solvent.
were
corporation
debtor
the
though
even
Since the right of a class of security holders to participate in
a plan of reorganization depends upon whether the valuation of
corporate assets shows the existence of an equity for that class,
cisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 21,
April 2, 1940, p. 11; In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22,-April 11, 1940, p. 19.
16. Advocates of this theory would give old security holders the same
relative position in new securities and would not exclude those shown to have
no equity. It is "really a theory of priority of income position, rather than
a theory of priority of principal." (Note (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 1030, 1035).
This theory seems never to have been specifically recognized by the courts
(Note (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 549, 550-553) and has been rejected by the Commission, eo nomine in the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C.
Holding Company Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 26, and its principles
refuted in the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 21, April 2, 1940, p. 11, the Commission pointing
out that mere "formal" preservation of the legal ranking of securities Is not
enough to insure "fairness." The relative priority theory was first advanced
in Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the
Last Decade (1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 901, 912. See also Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 127; Foster, Conflicting Ideals
for Reorganization (1935) 44 Yale L. J. 923.
17. In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, February 6, 1940, p. 9.
18. In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April 11, 1940, p. 19.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id. at 23. The Commission conceded that no solvency cases had
reached the Supreme Court under Section 77B or Chapter X, but relied upon
several leading cases in lower federal courts where the debtor was considered
solvent, quoting one opinion, viz., ". . . I do not believe a bankruptcy court
Is authorized in a bankruptcy proceeding to do anything else than to follow
the priorities that would be followed in any other proceeding . . . 'the Bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject
to the Fifth Amendment.'" See Miller, supra note 2, at 488, n. 36, for citation
to a case implying that, if the corporation is not insolvent in the bankruptcy
sense and all bondholders agree, certain sacrifices may be asked of the bondholders.
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the starting point in considering the fairness of any plan involves
estimation of the value of the enterprise. 21 In determining "value,"
the Commission has repeatedly stated that, "for purposes of reorganization, reasonably prospective earnings of the enterprise
constitute the true measure of its value. '22 Elements such as book
values, original or historical costs, and reproduction cost new less
depreciation, are regarded generally as of evidentiary significance
2
only insofar as they bear upon the question of earning power. 1
Consideration is frequently given to these factors, not because
they are direct standards of value for reorganization purposes,
but because they may have a bearing on future earnings, particularly in instances where earnings are regulated by rate-making
bodies. 24 Any existing likelihood that state rate-making bodies
may alter the rate scale in the near future is recognized as a factor in computing future gross income as the basis for determining
value, 25 and immediate prospects of an upturn in business have
been considered in supporting a higher "valuation" than other
factors would have seemed to justify.-" Capitalization bases are
determined by the amount of risk involved in the operation of the
particular business. 2 The existence of a contingent interest may
21. In the Matter of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 13, June 16, 1939, p. 8.
22. Id. at 5. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., 3 S.E.C. 104, 112
(Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938); In the Matter of La
France Industries, S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 16, Sept. 1,
1939, p. 11, and authorities cited; In the Matter of San Francisco Bay TollBridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 21, April 2, 1940, p.
11; In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April 11, 1940, p. 8.
Past earnings are substantially indicative of future earnings only if the
essential factors involved in producing them have not been subjected to
substantial change. (In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., supra at
8-12). In calculating the present value of future earnings, the earnings must
be "discounted at a rate of return which may be considered appropriate in
view of the risks inherent in the enterprise." (In the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., supra at 12). See Bonbright, Valuation of Property
(1937) 238; Finletter, op. cit. supra note 12, at c. VII.
23. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding
Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 17; In the Matter of Flour
Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April
11, 1940, p. 17, n. 50. See Finletter, op. cit. supra note 12, at 499-502; Bonbright,
op. cit. supra note 19, at 875-881, 883, 893. Current market value of securities
may also be of some evidentiary use in determining value. In the Matter
of Flour Mills of America, Inc., supra at 18, n. 55.
24. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 18.
25. Ibid.
26. In the Matter of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act
Release No. 1284, Oct. 22, 1938, p. 6.
27. In the Matter of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 13, June 16, 1939, p. 8; In the Matter of La France
Industries, S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 16, Sept. 1, 1939,
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preclude accurate valuation, however, and in such a case the
Commission has permitted a tentatively higher valuation and inclusion in the new plan of stockholders whose equity was like28
wise contingent.
Consistently following the rule that "the priorities of the re29
spective classes of security holders must be fully recognized,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has disapproved every
proposed plan which has given any appreciable recognition to
security holders whose equity disappeared with the new valuation." In three decisions, the Commission has proscribed the continued influence of such stockholders in the management of the
reorganized company, 81 and in the Utilities Power & Light opinion,8 2 it was made clear that a plan would be regarded as unfair
although the only recognition accorded such old stockholders consisted in giving them warrants to subscribe for new shares at a
price which would not be advantageous unless the earnings of
3
In the latter holdthe corporation should substantially increase.2
ing, the Commission rejected the argument that the federal bankruptcy power did not authorize the exclusion of the stockholders 8
p. 16; In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April 11, 1940, p. 18, n. 53. For a discussion of
valuation and capitalization theories, see Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (1934) Book II, especially pp. 169-177.
28. In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, February 6, 1940, p. 10. It should be noted that
the plan at issue involved the liquidation of the company. It is suggested
that, in the absence of this factor, the unusually high valuation would not
have been permitted.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Ibid.; In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 115
(Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938); In the Matter of Penn
Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 8, March 17, 1939;
In the Matter of Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 13, June 16, 1939, p. 8; In the Matter of La France Industries,
S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 16, Sept. 1, 1939, p. 11; In the
Matter of Utilities Power & Light Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release
No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 34 (disapproval of an alternate plan); In the Matter
of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 21, April 2, 1940, p. 14; In the Matter of Flour Mills of America,
Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April 11, 1940, pp. 20-25.
31. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 116 (Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938); In the Matter of Penn
Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 8, March 17, 1939,
p. 13; In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940, p. 11.
32. S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, pp. 22-29.
See also In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April 11, 1940, p. 26.
33. Accord: In re Chicago, G.W. R.R., 29 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ill. 1939).
34. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 23.
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and dismissed a contention that the relative priorities of security
holders, established in the charter of the debtor corporation, have
no application except upon dissolution, liquidation, or other dis35
tribution of capital to security holders.
Two of the plans which have been reviewed by the Commission under the Chandler Act involved the proposed "gradual
liquidation" of the corporation under the continued supervision
of the court.3 6 In each of these opinions, it was stated that the
contemplated liquidation afforded no grounds for exception from
the requirements of fairness and feasibility T The "gradual liquidation" scheme proposed in the Penn Timber Company reorganization as necessitated a rather unique application of the "strict
priority" rule. The plan provided for the court's retention of jurisdiction over the new corporation, the sale of its assets and the
distribution of its proceeds over a period of at least ten years.3
During that period a moratorium would, in effect, prevail upon
the exercise of creditors' rights; and two funds were to be set
up, one for ratable distribution to the bondholders and the other
to be used for the purchase of such bonds as could be bought at
a discount on the open market during the ten year moratorium.
The proponents of the plan testified that the purpose of this second fund was to permit the purchase of bonds at prices which
would enable the building up of an increment for the junior interests, these junior interests being otherwise without any re35. Id. at 25.
36. In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 8, March 17, 1939; In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc.,
S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940.
37. In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 8, March 17, 1939, pp. 10, 11; In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940,
p. 5, citing In re Central Funding Corporation, 75 F. (2d) 256 (C.C.A. 2d,
1935).
38. Supra note 27.
39. In disapproving the plan as not "feasible," the Commission pointed
out that the shortest possible time in which the proposed plan could be expected to wind up corporate affairs was forty-five years! In the Matter of
Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 8, March 17,
1939, p. 8. The Commission also took exception to the prolonged retention of
jurisdiction by the court, saying "If it is intended to impose upon the Court
such duties as are imposed upon It by a reorganization proceeding or a receivership, it Is difficult to reconcile this provision with the provision for
management which apparently contemplates the operation of the enterprise
as an ordinary corporation by its own Board of Directors. As an additional
consideration there Is the legal problem presented by the keeping open of
an estate for an indefinite length of time after an apparent consummation
of a plan of reorganization." In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., supra, at
15-16.
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maining equity in the enterprise. The Commission condemned
this scheme in unequivocal terms, pointing out that the increment
would be built up entirely at the expense of senior creditors who
were forced-by the moratorium-to throw their bonds on the
market at sacrificial prices. Reiterating the principle that inclusion of the junior interests could be justified only upon the basis
of a new consideration moving from those interests, the Commission stated its position broadly:
"It seems immaterial to us in judging the fairness of the
plan to distinguish between the various devices that may be
adopted for giving one class of security holders participation
at the expense of another and prior class. Where such a result
will follow from the provisions of the plan, regardless of what
the particular provisions may be, we believe that the plan
'
must be condemned as unfair. '4o
The gradual liquidation system, as such, is not proscribed, however. In the Reynolds Investing Co. opinion 41 the Commission
approved such a plan despite the fact that some equity might
admittedly be thereby created for non-contributing junior interests. Conceding that such a plan seems inconsistent with
"strict priority" principles, the Commission felt that that consideration was outweighed in the particular case by the benefits
which the senior creditors might derive from the gradual liquidation. It was further pointed out in the opinion that those who
elected to sell their securities in advance of redemption or ultimate liquidation had some assurance that they would not be required to sell at an excessive discount in order to secure immediate
payment. This assurance consisted of requirements for continued
interest payments during the so-called moratorium and for adequate disclosure of the data necessary for an intelligent appraisal
of the value of the debentures each time tenders were solicited,
and a provision that substantial retirements must be made at the
end of the first three years following consummation of the plan.
The Commission said:
"In view of these characteristics of the plan, it may be argued
that, although an equity may be created for junior security
holders because some debenture holders may elect to accept
immediate payment instead of awaiting ultimate distribution,
40. In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 8, March 17, 1939, p. 13.
41. S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940.
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this creation of an equity does not result from the imposition
of sacrifices on debenture holders but from purely voluntary
and adequately informed action on their part.","
It has been made clear, nevertheless, that in any case where senior creditors are subjected to a delay in realization upon the assets
subject to their lien, considerations must be found which can be
4s
said to be compensation for such delay.
Certain circumstances have been recognized as justifying the
subordination of senior interests to legally inferior claims. A
striking example of such exceptions to "strict priority" principles
is the so-called "instrumentality doctrine" which the United
States Supreme Court has recently set forth in Taylor v. Standard Gas and Electric Co.44 In that case it was held that, in reorganization of a wholly controlled subsidiary company, open
account claims of the parent holding company must be subordinated to the rights of preferred stockholders. The court pointed
out that the parent company had been in complete control of the
subsidiary and recited "abuses in management due to the paramount interest of interlocking officers and directors in the preser45
vation of Standard's position as at once proprietor and creditor"
which were felt to justify non-adherence to strictly legal priority
rights. This application of the rule that the corporate entity will
not be regarded when so to do would work fraud or injustice has
been cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission in its
approval of a reorganization plan which involved another subsidiary of the same holding company and in which the open account claims of the latter were again treated as inferior to the
rights of preferred stockholders."
Various factors have also been considered as affording reason
for the inclusion of junior interests which would seem to have
no remaining legal interest in the reorganized corporation. Where
42. Id. at 9.
43. In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 8, March 17, 1939, p. 6; In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co.,
Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940, pp. 6, 7.
(An investment trust being involved in the latter case, it was particularly
important that the length of the period allotted for liquidation of all assets
should not subject the senior security holders to speculative risks of market
depreciation beyond those necessarily incident to an orderly liquidation. The
proposed period of eight years was felt by the Commission to be too long
under the circumstances).
44. 306 U.S. 307, 59 S.Ct. 543, 83 L.Ed. 669 (1939).
45. 306 U.S. 307, 323, 59 S.Ct. 543, 550, 83 L.Ed. 669, 677 (1939).
46. In the Matter of Mountain States Power Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1570, June 12, 1939.
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the realization upon certain potential assets depended upon the
result of pending litigation against the directors of the old company, the Commission permitted the inclusion of stockholders
who might be said to have a sort of contingent equity."7 It was

made clear, however, that the participation of these interests was
entirely dependent upon the success of the legal action. In another case the Commission permitted the allocation of a "relatively insignificant" portion of the new stock to the old stockholders because a substantial amount of the old common stock
was held by operating men employed by the reorganized, company's subsidiaries, and it was felt that their participation in the
plan involved an element of good-will which might be of importance to the senior security holders. 8 Permitting the participation of stockholders without equity solely because of their
''nuisance value" is regarded by the Commission as a practice
having only doubtful merit.' 9 Participation has been permitted,
nevertheless, as a compromise of claims which debenture holders
(who had no remaining equity) had asserted to certain cash."
Although the Commission based its decision primarily upon this
factor, the pressing necessity of securing the debenture holders'
cooperation and assent to the plan was also mentioned as a factor
justifying their participation,5 1 and stock purchase warrants were
permitted to be given to the old stockholders in order to obtain

their consent to certain charter amendments. 52 In several cases
the insignificance of the amount of participation allowed the jun47. In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940.
48. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 6.
49. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 27. See also Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 1, 84 L.Ed. 22 (1939), in which
the United States Supreme Court said that new consideration in "money
or money's worth" is the only basis for stockholder participation in the reorganization of an insolvent corporation.
50. In the Matter of Detroit International Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 9, March 24, 1939, p. 6. The debenture holders
were given 7.7% of the new stock.
51. Ibid. The stock of a Canadian subsidiary was pledged to secure the
debentures and a reorganization of the Canadian company to complete the
reorganization of the debtor would, under Canadian law, require the cooperation of the debenture holders or would necessitate an expensive foreclosure
proceeding. Such a foreclosure would have meant elimination of the Canadian corporation, which it was felt desirable to preserve.
52. The passage of the amendments would preclude necessity for the
formation of a new corporation and would avoid possible difficulties which
might arise through the transfer of bridge franchises to such new corporation. The stock purchase warrants were said to be of "little if any value."
Id. at 6-7.
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ior interests has been mentioned as a reason why objection should
not be made to their participation. Where, however, a quantitatively insignificant allocation of stock to the old stockholders was
sufficient to give them the balance of power over a narrow margin of voting control between the public and the old management,
the Commission strictly forbade such allocation. 5 4 Further, as
concerns relatively small inequities in a proposed financial plan,
the Commission has twice indicated that approval of the plan by
the various senior creditors-if they are in a position to form independent judgment-is to be regarded as a factor in determining
that the plan is "fair" as to them.55
In the Genesee Valley Gas Co. reorganization," various secured notes were placed in separate categories due to differences
in the collateral securing them and there was wide discrepancy
between the treatments accorded the several classes." The Coin53. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Company, S.E.C.
Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 5 (2.82% of the new
common stock); In the Matter of Mountain States Power Co., S.E.C. Holding
Company Act Release No. 1570, June 12, 1939, p. 3 (1.08% of the new common stock); In the Matter of Detroit International Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 9, March 24, 1939, p. 7 (stock warrants
of "little if any value"); In the Matter of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding
Co. Act Release No. 1284, Oct. 22, 1938, pp. 10-11 (A slight discrimination in
favor of one set of bonds over another was permitted due to the "very small
percentage" of stock involved).
54. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 116 (Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938). Approximately 2% of the
new stock (739 shares) was to go to the old stockholders. Although this was
less than the 2.82% which the Commission deemed a "relatively insignificant
portion of the equity" in the United Telephone case, the 2% represented much
power. With that 2%, the old management would have had 51.4% of the
voting power. Without it the majority control would be lost. Cf. In the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 21, April 2, 1940, pp. 4, 14, where a plan was held unfair because
the old debenture holders (without equity) were given new Class B stock,
although the Class B stock had only 2% of the voting power, ranked behind
all other securities (and hence had no actual value under the circumstances),
and only one share was given for each $1,000 claim. Note that this opinion
was rendered after the Supreme Court opinion in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 1, 84 L.Ed. 22 (1939), had stated that only
a new contribution in "money or money's worth" would justify participation
by such junior interests.
55. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 6; In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655,
July 28, 1939, p. 21. Compare the language in the latter case (p. 27, n. 45)
where the Commission speaks of its "duty to exercise an Informed, independent judgment" as to fairness of plans even though they be unopposed.
56. 3 S.E.C. 104, 115 (Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24,
1938).
57. Most of the secured notes (totaling $121,000) were allocated new
common stock on a basis of 100 shares for each $1,000 claim, but a $2,600
note-held by the corporation's president and well secured-was to be given
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mission conceded that variant quality in security might justify
some difference in treatment if nothing were allocated to the old
stock, but it disapproved the plan in the instant case and stated
that there could be no justification for such differentiation in a
case where, without assessment, the old stock was to participate
in the reorganized company. 58 In another case, the rule de minimis
was followed in permitting slightly preferential treatment of certain bonds as against other bonds which were more favorably
secured. 59 The comparative records of past interest payments 0
and the compromise of claims and potential litigation 61 are other
items which have been considered by the Commission in allowing
difference in treatment of security holders under reorganization
plans.
The courts have acknowledged that differences in priority of
contract rights may be recognized in various ways.62 Of these
methods, the Commission would appear to favor that of the allocation to various classes of different amounts of the same new
security. In the Utilities Power & Light report 8 the Commission
pointed out that it is not necessary to allocate, to holders of senior
securities, new securities prior in rank to those allocated to holders of junior securities, and it indicated that alterations in priority under the new plan could be adequately compensated in terms
of the relative amounts of a single type of new security. It was
indicated that, particularly under the Holding Company Act,
deviation from such method would be inadvisable, since that Act 4
makes clear the Congressional intention that unsound and complex capital structures should be avoided. Another method of
1,600 shares of the new common, on a basis of 616 shares per $1,000 claim.
The Commission said that "such a glaring differentiation of treatment . . . is
arbitrary In the extreme ....
Id. at 114.
58. Ibid. If junior interests are to be given anything, senior claims should
be accorded their full legal rights without regard to the relative quality of
collateral security.

59. In the Matter of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act
Release No. 1284, Oct. 22, 1938, pp. 10-11.
60. Id. at 10.
61. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 6.
62. Kansas City Terminal Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445,
46 S.Ct. 549, 70 L.Ed. 1028 (1936). The following methods have been approved:
(1) Distribution of a higher ranking security, (2) Issuance of different
amounts of the same security, (3) Providing for payment of disparate assess-

ments, (4) Giving securities with various income yields, and (5) Combinations of the other methods. See Note (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 549.
63. S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 20.

64. Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1985, § 7(d) (1), 49 Stat. 816, 15 U.S.
C.A. § 79g(d) (1).
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recognizing legal priorities which the Securities and Exchange
Commission has approved is the giving to senior creditors new
debentures with an earlier maturity date than that of similar
debentures given to inferior creditors."'
FEASIBILITY

A plan of reorganization must not only be fair, but it must
also be "feasible." The issue of feasibility is whether or not, under
the proposed plan, the reorganization proceedings can be terminated and the company left with sufficient working capital for its
immediate needs. 68 "Feasibility" is specifically required by the
Chandler Act as a prerequisite to court approval of a proposed
plan,B and the Securities and Exchange Commission is given an
opportunity to render advisory opinions as to whether or not it
deems such plan worthy of court approval.68 Although the Holding Company Act contains no similar requirement, the language
of the Securities and Exchange Commission opinions under that
statute reveals that the Commission is considering whether or not
the proposed reorganization plan will set the company on its feet
or will leave it in such condition as to precipitate another failure.69
In approving one plan, the Commission pointed out that its adoption "should place the Company in a sound position both from
the standpoint of earnings and ability to meet its financial obligations. 7 0 "Soundness" of a plan, in view of this language, would
appear to be practically synonymous with "feasibility. '" 1 Appar65. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 4.
66. In the Matter of National Radiator Corp., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 10, March 25, 1939, p. 7; In the Matter of San Fran-

cisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 21,
April 2, 1940, pp. 5-6; In

the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C.

Corporate Reorganization Release No. 22, April 11, 1940, pp. 26-27.
67. Chapter X, §§ 174, 221, 52 Stat. 891, 897, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 547, 621 (1938).
68. Chapter X, §§ 172, 173, 52 Stat. 890, 891, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 572, 578 (1938).
69. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 5. (In approving a plan,
the S.E.C. pointed out that operations thereunder would make available
sufficient Income for "the payment of all interest charges and sinking fund

requirements"); In the Matter of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, Oct. 22, 1938, p. 8.
70. In the Matter of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act

Release No. 1284, Oct. 22, 1938, p. 8.
71. It is interesting to note that the problem was discussed under an
italicised heading, Soundness of the Plan, similar to the heading Fairness of
the Plan in the same case and headings Feasibility of the Plan in several

of the Chandler Act opinions. In the San FranciscoBay Toll-Bridge opinion
(S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 21, April 2, 1940, pp. 5-6) the
various factors of "feasibility" were enumerated, viz., "These include the
soundness of the proposed capital structure of the reorganized company and
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ently following a similar line of thought, the Commission has
refused to approve a plan the success of which was wholly con72
tingent upon an unpredictable external event. The Commission
reasoned that approval of the plan would lack the "finality" which
administrative action should have, but this seems merely another
way of stating that a plan will not be approved unless it appears
certain that, if it be adopted, there will be 78a substantial chance
of economic rehabilitation of the enterprise.
Where it appears that under a proposed plan the reorganized
company will be able to pay the reorganization expenses, keep
up with its new schedule of fixed charges and have sufficient
working capital to continue its operations, such plan is recognized
as "feasible."7 4 On the other hand, a plan which imposes an overburdening proportion of senior securities or under which it is
clear that, for other reasons, another reorganization will be sub76
sequently necessary, the plan will be disapproved. Feasibility
demands that the debtor's difficulties should be resolved in the
single proceeding.,'
The interrelation between "fairness" and "feasibility" is interesting. In the Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co. opinion" a proposed
plan was held "unfair," it being pointed out that the very factors
which made for feasibility, i.e., the cutting down of fixed charges,
were accomplished solely at the expense of the first mortgage
given in return the compensation to
bondholders who were not
79
entitled.
were
which they
In one opinion under the Holding Company Act, a plan was
approved although it was quite apparent that there was insuffici(Italics supof the several classes of securities proposed to be issued.
plied.)
72. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., 3 S.E.C. 104, 110-111 (Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938). An essential factor in the
financial picture of the reorganized company was dependent upon the decision of the New York Public Service Commission concerning the propriety
of a certain accounting practice.
73. See Note (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 680, 684.
74. In the Matter of Detroit International Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 9, March 24, 1939, p. 7; In the Matter of National
Radiator Corp., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 10, March 25,
1939, p. 7.
75. In the Matter of La France Industries, S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 16, Sept. 1, 1939, p. 18. The weight of cumulative preferred
dividend requirements was considered as well as that of bond interest
charges.
76. In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 8. March 17, 1939, p. 10.
77. Ibid.
78. S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 13, June 16, 1939, p. 8.
79. Id. at 11.
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ent economic justification for the existence of the company (a
holding company) and no reorganization could result in its recovery as a going concern.8 ° In approving the plan, the Commission pointed out that liquidation seemed to be the only "feasible"
solution and that it granted its approval primarily because of the
belief that the simplification of the security structure to be
effected by the plan would facilitate such liquidation.8' In one of
the cases involving a "gradual liquidation" plan, the Commission recognized that, where there is no intention of reviving the
concern permanently, "feasibility" requirements may be somewhat relaxed.82 On this theory it approved a plan although the
new senior securities had a "face or redemptive value" which
would have been excessive but for the fact that liquidation was
contemplated, and although it was plain that debenture interest
requirements would have to be met from the new company's
capital assets. The "gradual liquidation" plan in another case,
however, was so grossly impractical that it was felt that its
adoption could not be justified for any reason.8 The quality of
management is, of course, a vital factor in the practical operations of any business. Accordingly, the Commission has indicated
that, where the history of the company shows that its past difficulties may be attributed in some part to errors of judgment on the
part of the old management, the requirement of "feasibility"
demands that a new management take over the affairs of the re84
organized company.
OTHER OBJECTIVES OF THE HOLDING COMPANY ACT

In determining whether to approve or disapprove a plan of
reorganization submitted to it, under Section 11 (f) of the Holding Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission is
guided by the basic principles expressed elsewhere in the Act.8 5
80. In the Matter of National Public Utilities Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1690, Aug. 16, 1939.
81. Id. at 11.

82. In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940, p. 10.
83. In the Matter of Penn Timber Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization
Release No. 8, March 17, 1939, p. 10. The proposed liquidation involved the
sale of timber lands on a plan which the Commission found would take at

least forty-five years. Over that period of time interests requirements of various obligations would become so large as to necessitate a new reorganization.
84. In

the Matter of National Radiator Corp., S.E.C. Corporate

Reor-

ganization Release No. 10, March 25, 1939, p. 7.
85. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 2 and p. 3, n. 6.
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Section 11 (b) expresses a threefold objective: the creation of
geographically integrated public utility systems,86 the elimination
of unnecessary complexity in the structure of holding company
systems,8 7 and the distribution of voting control of the reorganized
corporation fairly and equitably among the security holders.8
Simplification of the capital structure of the corporations which
make up each holding company system is another objective,
drawn from Section 7.89
Approval of a plan which promoted geographical integration
of a holding company "system," whose activities had been widely
dispersed, was given by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Utilities Power & Light opinion.90 In that case, the
company in reorganization was a holding company whose investments consisted largely of widely scattered properties devoted to both utility and other purposes. 1 The new plan provided
that all voting stocks were to be sold and that the reorganized
company should be purely an investment company, being thus
entirely eliminated from the holding company structure. In another case, the Commission approved the liquidation of a holding
company, pointing out that a holding company operating small
and widely scattered gas utility companies had little economic
justification.92 Where an approved plan accomplishes nothing as
regards the integration requirements of Section 11, the Commission has made it clear that the reorganized company will continue
to face the necessity of taking such action in this respect as the
Commission may require.9 8
86. Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, § 11(b) (1), 49 Stat. 820, 15
U.S.C.A. § 79(k) (b) (1). See also id. at § 10(c)(2), 49 Stat. 819, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79j
(c)(2) (1938).
87. Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, § 11(b) (2), 49 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.
C.A. § 79k(b)(2) (1938).
88. Ibid.
89. Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935, § 7(d)(1), 49 Stat. 816, 15 U.S.
C.A. § 79g(d)(1).
90. SE.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939.
91. The subsidiaries consisted of box factories, broadcasting stations,
motion picture theatres, a coal mine and a small railroad in Canada. The
utility properties were for the most part incapable of physical interconnection and the relation of many of the non-utilities to the utilities was either
non-existent or so remote as to be imperceptible. Id. at 4-5.
92. In the Matter of National Public Utilities Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1690, Aug. 16, 1939, p. 11.
93. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1193, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 10. "Nothing herein contained shall be construed as a finding that the operations of the company
are limited to a single integrated public utility system and to such other
businesses as are reasonably incidental or economically necessary or appropriate to its operations within the meaning of Section 11(b)(1) of the Act
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The expressed policy of reducing the unnecessarily complex
structure found in some holding company systems has been constantly adhered to by the Commission. Where the proposed plan
would result in a relatively simple structure this factor has been
cited in the report approving the plan.9 4 Where, however, a holding company system of four tiers was involved and the plan
revealed no effort at simplification thereof, the Commisssion
expressed its sharp disapproval. 5 Pointing out that this was not
essential to the decision, the plan having been disapproved as
"unfair," the Commission clarified its position on this point, saying that the absence of any provisions for "eliminating" applicant's existing holding company system was a distinct limitation
in the scope of the plan and that
"... the crucial factors underlying the system (and which
have made necessary the present reorganization) urge something more than a mere palliative-removal of three uneconomic structures from the back of an income-producing unit
might well be considered as the first requirement of any effective therapeutic."98
The requirement of "fair and equitable distribution" of voting control, aimed at the unfettered discretion sometimes exercised by "management" in perpetuating its own power,O is
considered by the Commission in its examination of proposed
plans.98 Accordingly, it has disapproved the allocation of a most
minute portion of common stock to the old stockholders where
such allocation would have been sufficient to permit retention of
voting control by the old management. 9
The avoidance of unsound and complex capital structures is
a goal continually sought by the Commission, under the mandate
and the Commission reserves jurisdiction under that Section." In the Matter
of Mountain States Power Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No.
1570, June 12, 1939, p. 8.
94. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 5; In the Matter of

West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, Oct. 22,
1938, p. 4.

95. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 116-117
(Holding Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938).
96. Ibid.
97. See Berle and Means, op. cit. supra note 8, at 84-118.
98. In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C. Holding
Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 1938, p. 6; In the Matter of Utilities
Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July
28, 1939, p. 29.
99. In the Matter of Genesee Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 116 (Hold-

ing Company Act Release No. 981, Jan. 24, 1938). Cf. note 51, supra.
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of Section 7.100 In the Securities and Exchange Commission opinions considered herein it is to be noted that the approved plans
are unanimous in providing comparatively simple capitalization
for the reorganized companies, and the Commission has, from
time to time, made it plain that this is no coincidence,"' stating
that such simplicity is "undoubtedly" in the interest of inves10 2
tors.
MISCELLANEOUS FACTORS CONSIDERED
Other considerations which appear to have been regarded by
the Securities and Exchange Commission in its examination of
financial plans submitted to it, seem to center largely around the
objective of protecting the investing public. In the San Francisco
Bay Toll-Bridge opinion, 10 3 the issuance of securities without
value or which were otherwise possibly deceptive to prospective
purchasers was strongly disapproved. The Commission pointed
out that, under Chapter X of the present Bankruptcy Act (as
well as under old 77B), securities distributed in pursuance of a
reorganization plan are expressly exempt from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933; accordingly there is
no public filing to put the public on notice as to the material
facts concerning issuance of the securities. The exemption is based
on the view that the Court's approval and confirmation of a reorganization plan affords adequate protection to investors. Since
subsequent purchasers are entitled to assume that securities
issued in the course of an approved reorganization plan are in
accord with requirements of sound finance, the Commission must
carefully scrutinize proposed plans to see that unsound security
issues are not placed on the market. In so doing, the Commission
has considered a variety of factors which it has deemed important
for the protection of investors. The establishment of sinking fund
provisions contemplating rapid retirement of obligations has met
with the approval of the Commission,"' as has the incorporation
100. Supra note 86. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C.
Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 21.
101. E.g., In the Matter of the United Telephone and Electric Co., S.E.C.
Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, p. 5; In the Matter
of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1284, Oct.
22, 1938, p. 4; In the Matter of National Public Utilities Corp., S.E.C. Holding
Company Act Release No. 1690, Aug. 16, 1939, p. 10.
102. In the Matter of National Public Utilities Corp., S.E.C. Holding
Company Act Release No. 1690, Aug. 16, 1939, p. 10.
103. In the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 21, April 2, 1940, pp. 6, 10.
104. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 20; In the Matter of Genesee

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. II

5
into the plan of cognate protective features."" Where, in order
to secure the cooperation of common stockholders, it was proposed that stock-purchase warrants, with "little if any value," be
issued to stockholders, the Commission opposed this element of
the plan. Clearly demonstrating its interest in the welfare of
potential purchasers, the Commission questioned the advisability
of issuing securities without value "in view of the possibilities of
transfer to persons less well advised," and it stated that, if the
benefits derived from the issuance of the warrants justified their
inclusion in the plan, consideration should be given to restricting
their transferability. 0 8 Similarly, where the value of proposed
issues of preferred and common stock was entirely contingent
upon the outcome of certain litigation, the advisory opinion of
the Commission recommended that the voting trust certificates
which represented this stock should plainly indicate to prospective purchasers the contingent nature of the interest °7 and should
also show that the preferred stock was to have no rights of participation until the debentures were completely retired and the
common stock none until the preferred be retired. 08 The Commission further suggested that "as a further means of avoiding
misapprehension or possible fraud" in the last-mentioned case,
it would be more desirable for the trust certificates issued to be
designated by some name other than stock, e.g., Class A and
Class B participation certificates.?'
Valley Gas Co., Inc., 3 S.E.C. 104, 117 (Holding Company Act Release No.
981, Jan. 24, 1938, p. 20).
105. In the Matter of Utilities Power & Light Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1655, July 28, 1939, p. 20. The "protective features" approved included, inter alia, a provision that no dividends should be paid on
the common stock until "the principle amount of the new debentures outstanding shall have been theretofore reduced to less than 25% of the assets
" (id. at 12) A requirement that a two-thirds vote
of the New Company ..
of both preferred and common stock should be required to authorize the
creation of any additional funded debt (id. at 13), and a requirement thatupon the accumulation of $1.87% unpaid preferred dividends-the preferred
stockholders should be entitled to elect two-thirds of the board of directors
(ibid).
106. In the Matter of Detroit International Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 9, March 24, 1939, p. 7. See also In the Matter
of Flour Mills of America, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No.
22, April 11, 1940, p. 26, where the issuance of valueless stock purchase warrants was said to be "contrary to public policy." It was further pointed out
that, if the corporation should become prosperous and the warrants become
valuable, the fact that they were outstanding might hinder possible future
financing. Hence the issuance of the warrants was felt to be unsound from
the point of view of the corporation.
107. In the Matter of Reynolds Investing Co., Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 19, Feb. 6, 1940, p. 10.
108. Id. at 10-11.
109. Id. at 11.
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The issuance of hybrid-type securities is looked upon with
disfavor by the Commission. In the Griess-Pfleger Tanning Co.
opinion, 110 disapproval was expressed of the proposed issue of
so-called "Capital Income Debentures." These securities were to
have no lien against the property of the company, bore contingent
interest-cumulative but payable only if earned-,were to be
subordinated to the claims of all existing and future creditors,
and were to have an important part in the control of the company.
The Commission pointed out that these "debentures" would be
in substance merely a preferred stock and should be frankly
labeled as such. "Such a security," said the Commission, ". . . is
unsound and deceptive and will place the initial holders, as well
as subsequent purchasers and sellers, at a serious disadvantage
in their dealings with one another.""' Similarly, the issuance of
income bonds was made a matter of objection by the Commission
on the theory that such contingent interest bonds might indicate
rights the realization of which may well prove illusory. It was
stated that a sound reorganization plan should not include the
probable earnings,
issuance of securities with charges exceeding
2
contingent."
be
charges
such
though
even
A device which has been the subject of criticism as one of
the means of divorcing control from ownership in corporate affairs
is the "voting trust.""" Accordingly, it should be expected that
the Securities and Exchange Commission would look upon the
establishment of such a trust with disfavor. In the case of the
United Telephone and Electric Co.,1 4 however, the Commission
was confronted with certain practical considerations which it
deemed sufficient to justify approval of the establishment of such
a device. The approved plan provided for the surrender of voting
control by the old common stockholders and gave 97.18% of such
control to the persons who had been holders of the old preferred
stock. These persons were utterly inexperienced in the management of corporate affairs and, if those affairs were to be managed
efficiently, it was necessary to obtain a new chief executive from
outside. An executive of sufficient ability and experience to direct
the varied affairs of the corporation could not be obtained, however, without assurance of some security of tenure. Widely scattered holdings of the stock created a possibility of frequent
110.
111.
112.
Release

S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 13, June 16, 1939, p. 11.
Id. at 12.
In the Matter of West Ohio Gas Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act
No. 1284, Oct. 22, 1938, pp. 11-12.

113. See Berle and Means, op. cit. supra note 8, at 77-78.
114. S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 1187, Aug. 5, 1938, pp. 6-8.
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shifting of management by means of active proxy campaigns
1
among the inexperienced stockholders.' 5 Reasonable continuity
of service could be promised to executives if a five year voting
trust were set up."' Accordingly, the Commission gave its approval to the plan conditioned upon certain changes, which
included a provision that, if the voting trust were not terminated
by the referendum to be held at the end of three years, any
stockholder could withdraw his securities from the trust. Moreover, the fact that the principal creditors whose interest was at
stake were insisting upon the adoption of the voting trust device
was stressed by the Commission in its approving opinion. In
addition the voting trustees were required to register as a holding company so as to permit retention of control by the Securities
and Exchange Commission."' In a recent advisory opinion,'18
handed down under the Chandler Act, a proposed voting trust
was not disapproved. The Commission suggested, however, that
its purpose (retention of control by bondholders who also were
holders of the voting stock) might be accomplished in a "less
cumbersome manner" by attaching the stock to the bonds.""8
CONCLUSION

Recent proposals to extend the authority of the Securities
and Exchange Commission over investment trusts 20 have given
rise to much controversy.' 2 ' The root of the problem lies around
115. For a discussion of methods and difficulties involved In a proxy campaign, see Berle and Means, op. cit. supra note 8, at 81-84, 88.
116. A different device was used to secure stability of management in
the West Ohio Gas Co. opinion (S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No.
1284, Oct. 22, 1938, p. 11). The initial board of directors being elected for a
three-year term.
117. With similar limitations, the creating of a voting trust was approved
in another case, at the instance of the holders of collateral trust bonds who
thereby obtained control of the company for five years. The ownership of
98% of the new common stock was in the holding company which had been
in control of the old company. It was felt that protection of the collateral
trust bondholders justified the creation of the voting trust, as against a contention that it unduly complicated the structure of the holding company
system. In the Matter of Great Lakes Utilities Co., 2 S.E.C. 129 (Holding
Company Act Release No. 595, April 5, 1937).
118. In the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Co., S.E.C. Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 21, April 2, 1940.
119. Id. at 5 and n. 8. The S.E.C. suggested further that, if the voting
trust device were used, provisions for notice to the holders of the bonds
should be adequate to permit them to actually exercise the control which it
was intended that they should have.
120. See the bill proposed by Senator Wagner and Mr. Lee, March 14,
1940, S. 3580.
121. See, for example, "Bankers Accused by S.E.C. of 'Baiting'," New
York Times, March 20, 1940, p. 1, col. 3, and Editorial, A Letter to the S.E.C.,
id. at 26, col. 2.
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two questions: (1) Is it advisable, as a matter of governmental
policy, to further extend the power of such an administrative
body? (2) Has the Commission abused the power already granted
it by Congress? The first of these issues is beyond the scope of
this discussion, but the opinions considered above may shed some
light upon the second.
From this survey it may be concluded that, insofar as the
reorganization plan opinions handed down to date are concerned,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has not attempted to
go beyond its legislative mandate or even to goto extreme limits
possibly permitted by the broad language of the Act. In determining the fairness of proposed plans, adherence to accepted legal
criteria has characterized the opinions and, in its determination
of feasibility (or "soundness") of proposed capital structures, the
Commission has not required standards beyond those of sound
fiscal policy. In promoting the purposes of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has carefully avoided the appearance of arbitrary conduct. It has
not, for example, dogmatically prohibited the use of voting trusts,
although it has made it plain that it will not countenance the use
of any device which will "unnecessarily" complicate capital
structures or permit abuse of fiduciary authority.
The moderation and flexibility with which the Securities and
Exchange Commission has handled the complex problems presented by proposed corporate reorganization plans heretofore
considered by it, merit much commendation. By avoiding dictatorial practices, the Commission has set an example which, if
consistently followed by all administrative boards and commissions, would considerably enhance the respect with which administrative law, as a system, is now regarded.
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CHARACTERIZATION AS AN APPROACH TO THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Litigation may in a sense be divided into two categories. The
ordinary case involves operative facts and issues which are connected with only that legislative jurisdiction in which the court
sits and the court simply applies the law of the forum. The second category-the conflict of laws case-involves operative facts
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